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Last Exit Bosnia – Transferring War Crimes 
Prosecution from the International Tribunal to Domestic 
Courts 
 
by MICHAEL BOHLANDER* 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was set up by the 
United Nations in 1993 as an ad hoc tribunal to try cases based on the violence then prevalent 
in some of the successor states of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  This 
choice of words meant, on the one hand, that it had not been in existence before (some of) the 
crimes it was meant to try were being committed and, on the other hand, that it was not meant 
to be a permanent institution.  The idea behind it was also that it should try mainly the top-
level perpetrators, the masterminds and political as well as military leaders of all sides to the 
conflict.  Due to the fact that in the beginning of its operation the war was still raging in 
Bosnia, and that therefore it was difficult to secure the presence of such high-ranking leaders, 
it started its first case with a low-level accused, Dusko Tadic, whose moniker almost became 
a household name, as the man who was the object of the first genuine international war 
crimes trial after Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
The people arrested and transferred to the ICTY in the course of the first few years 
were mostly of the same category, including a few one might term “middle-management”, 
like Blaskic, Kordic and Cerkez.  Apart from Slobodan Milosevic, who was unceremoniously 
handed over to the ICTY by the former Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic in an act of 
Gordian-knot-cutting, and the admittedly noble example of Biljana Plavsic’s public remorse, 
none of the former “big guns”, heads of state like Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, or 
the chief of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb Republic, Republika Srpska, Radovan 
Karadzic, and his executioner Ratko Mladic, have been arrested, let alone transferred to the 
Hague.  Izetbegovic has, to public knowledge and maybe not surprisingly, not been indicted 
to-date, and Tudjman died before the ICTY Prosecutor could make up her mind about 
whether or not to indict him. 
The backlog of cases at the ICTY, as well as the length of time it takes to finish an 
individual case, has spurred its judges to consider ways and means of finding an “exit 
strategy” that would help the ICTY do justice to the second meaning of the words “ad hoc” 
described above, and to wind down its operation within a reasonable time-frame.  The budget 
for the ICTY (and its sister tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda or ICTR) gobbles up a large slice of the United Nations financial pie, and other 
peace-keeping missions will clamour for their fair share of the same.  The ICTY was 
therefore under pressure to keep control of this process and to contribute as much as possible 
to shaping the procedure of phasing its cases out.  One way to do this was to consider the 
possibility of returning cases to the national judicial systems of the former Yugoslavia, and 
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here especially to Bosnia.  The Rome Agreement of 18 February 1996, also called the “Rules 
of the Road, an agreement between Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic1 already 
provided for a procedure of screening domestic investigations by the ICTY Prosecutor, 
without whose consent a local prosecution could not go forward.  But what was necessary 
now was a procedure that also worked the other way.  
This article presents an overview over the development of the exit strategy, and breaks 
new ground insofar as for the first time the Office of the High Representative’s (OHR) 
Consultants’ Report of 27 May 2002, which had been confidential and was kindly provided 
to me by the OHR, is described in detail.  The paper, on account of the myriad of legal issues 
involved, cannot be a critique of the legal background of the exit strategy, but merely gives 
an account of its factual development until April 2003. 
 
I. DEVELOPMENTS UNTIL MAY 2002 
 
In the year 2000, under the then presidency of Claude Jorda, now the French judge at 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and an especially energetic president of the ICTY as 
far as the critique and improvement of its performance were concerned, the judges began 
thinking ahead towards formulating a completion or exit strategy, after getting a little nudge 
from the Expert Group which scrutinised the functioning of both the ICTY and ICTR in 
1999.2  Elected President of the ICTY on 16 November 1999, already on 27 January 2000 
Claude Jorda made a first statement in which he promised to explore avenues of speeding up 
the proceedings of the ICTY, explicitly referring to the  report of the Expert Group.3  This 
was followed by an extraordinary plenary session on 18 April 2000, where the Prosecutor 
described for the first time her completion strategy in concrete numbers, and stated that she 
would finish thirty-six investigations, mainly related to Kosovo, by 2004.  The judges 
mandated the President to present a long-term judicial strategy for the tribunal.4  On 23 May 
2000, the President addressed the Plenary Meeting of the Peace Implementation Council, a 
 
1  Para. 5 of the Rome Agreement of 18 February 1996 provides:  
5. Cooperation on War Crimes and Respect for Human Rights: 
As part of their obligation to cooperate fully in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and 
other violations of international humanitarian law, as provided in Article IX of the General Framework 
Agreement, the Parties will provide unrestricted access to places, including mass grave sites, relevant 
to such crimes and to persons with relevant information. IFOR will work to provide a secure 
environment for the completion of these tasks. 
Persons, other than those already indicted by the International Tribunal, may be arrested and detained 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law only pursuant to a previously issued order, 
warrant, or indictment that has been reviewed and deemed consistent with international legal standards 
by the International Tribunal. Procedures will be developed for expeditious decision by the Tribunal 
and will be effective immediately upon such action. 
See the  OHR website at <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/hr-rol/thedept/war-crime-
tr/default.asp?content_id=6093> (last accessed on 19 May 2003). 
2  See the recommendations in the “Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective 
Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”, 22 November 1999, UN Doc. A/54/634, p. 101. 
3  Press release of 27 January 2000, CC/P.I.S./466.  This press release and all the following can be found 
on the ICTY website <www.un.org/icty> under “Latest developments”, in the folder “Archived Press 
Releases”. 
4  Press release of 18 April 2000, CC-JL/P.I.S./491-e. 
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body established under Annex 10 to the Dayton Agreement, and for the first time expressly 
mentioned that cases be tried by the states themselves.5 
In his speech to the Security Council on 20 June 2000, the President addressed almost 
exclusively the creation of a pool of so-called ad litem judges, who were to be assigned to 
cases on an ad hoc basis, but only for trials and not pre-trial proceedings.  President Jorda did 
not address at that time the ideas of referring cases back to domestic jurisdictions, maybe 
because it might have proved counter-productive with respect to the ad litem issue.6  In his 
Report on the Operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia of 
May 2000,7 which formed the basis of his speech before the Security Council in June, the 
President acknowledged8 the need to provide the administration of the United Nations with 
“a relatively exact idea of the length of the mandate”9 of the ICTY
A study by the Human Rights Centre and the International Human Rights Law Clinic 
of the University of California at Berkeley and the Centre for Human Rights of the University 
of Sarajevo10 of May 2000 had come to the conclusion that a larger involvement of the local 
justice systems in Bosnia was advisable, and that international lawyers often lacked the 
necessary familiarity with the legal system of Bosnia. 
The Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, indicated as early as 6 October 2000 that she might 
even be willing to consider co-operating in the prosecution of lower-level war criminals, on 
the occasion of a new initiative launched by the Republika Srspka to prosecute those involved 
in the Srebrenica massacre.11  In his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on 
20 November 2000, Claude Jorda again addressed the limited mandate and indicated that the 
ICTY was contemplating the idea of trials held by national justice systems.12  In her speech 
to the Security Council on 21 November 2000, the Prosecutor did, however, indicated that 
she not relish the intention expressed by Yugoslav President Kostunica of trying Slobodan 
Milosevic in Belgrade instead of transferring him to the ICTY.13  She repeated these 
sentiments in a press statement on 20 December 2000 in the Hague.14 
A first case in which the Prosecutor did not seek a referral under Rule 9 of the ICTY 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and openly applauded the activities of the domestic 
judiciary, was the Croatian investigation of former general Mirko Norac for his involvement 
in the so-called Gospic case and other war crimes.   Norac, who could be termed at least a 
mid-level offender,15 was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment for war crimes by the 
Rijeka County Court on 24 March 2003, a sentence commensurate with those handed down 
by the ICTY in similar cases.16 
 
5  Press release of  24 May 2000, CC/P.I.S./502-e. 
6  Press release of 20 June 2000, SB/P.I.S./512-e, containing the full text of the speech. 
7  Available on the ICTY website as an appendix to the press release of 20 June 2000, SB/P.I.S./512-e. 
8  At paras. 1 to 6 of the Report. 
9  Ibid., para. 3. 
10  “Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction, An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and 
Prosecutors’, May 2000, directed by Harvey Weinstein, Laurel Fletcher and Ermin Sarajlija. 
11  Press release of 6 October 2000, PR/P.I.S./532-e. 
12  Press release of 20 November 2000, JD/P.I.S./540-e, containing the full text of the speech. 
13  Press release of 24 November 2000, JL/P.I.S./542-e, containing the full text of the speech. 
14  Press release of 20 December 2000, FH/P.I.S./550-e. 
15  Press release of 21 February 2001, FH/P.I.S./565-3. 
16  See “News in Brief” on the website of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) Mission in Croatia <www.osce.org/croatia> (last accessed on 3 April 2003). 
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On 12 May 2001, Claude Jorda visited Sarajevo on the occasion of the debate about a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Bosnia, and there he expressed doubts and 
reservations regarding the quasi-judicial powers of that commission with respect to the 
primacy of the ICTY.  He said, inter alia, that the mandate of the truth and reconciliation 
commission must not be similar to that of the International Tribunal.  He stressed that 
although he supported the initiative, he was also concerned that the most recent draft law 
seemed to grant to the commission functions and powers similar in many ways to those of the 
International Tribunal.  For this reason, he did not believe that the commission was merely a 
complementary organ.  The draft law also failed to define clearly the commission's 
obligations to the International Tribunal.  He pointed out that the language of the draft 
implied that the truth and reconciliation commission will have judicial powers which belong 
exclusively to the International Tribunal, and that the commission appeared to be vested with 
real investigative powers. While investigating did not fall within the exclusive domain of the 
Prosecution, the Prosecutor nevertheless had primacy with respect to national jurisdiction in 
this area. Even though the commission was not bound by this principle, the draft law would 
have to take it in consideration. It also appeared to him that the Commission might have the 
authority to demand that it be provided with all information it considered useful for its 
mission, which infringed on the activity of the Prosecutor.  All this confused the role of the 
proposed commission and could risk infringing upon the International Tribunal's 
independence and prove extremely prejudicial to it in the long term.  To define the 
obligations of both the commission and the International Tribunal, he suggested that a 
provision expressly state that the commission would not interfere in any way in the judicial 
activity of the International Tribunal and that it would provide to the Tribunal all the public 
or confidential information and documents it required, maintain close contacts with its 
investigators and authorise a liaison officer from the International Tribunal to attend its 
hearings.  The ICTY’s mission of reconciliation would be seriously compromised if the 
highest political and military accused were not arrested and tried by the International 
Tribunal before the completion of its work.  Therefore, it was imperative that the commission 
and the Tribunal accomplish their respective mission jointly, which rendered necessary the 
prompt arrest and transfer of all accused to the Tribunal.17 
In his next address to the Security Council on 27 November 2001, Claude Jorda 
finally dealt with the idea of “relocating”, as he called it, cases to the states in the Balkans.  
He indicated that the judges of the two International Tribunals had met in September 2001 in 
Dublin, together with Hans Correll, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, and had 
undertaken to reflect upon the ICTY’s priorities for the years to come.  They discussed 
whether the ICTY should not focus more on prosecuting the crimes committed by the high-
ranking military and political officials.  The cases of lesser importance for the Tribunal could, 
under certain conditions, be “relocated”, that is, tried by the courts of the States created out of 
the former Yugoslavia.  This solution would have the merit of considerably lightening the 
Tribunal’s workload, thereby allowing it to complete its mission at an even earlier juncture.  
Moreover, it would make the trial of the cases referred to national courts more transparent to 
the local population and so make a more effective contribution to reconciling the peoples of 
the Balkans. 
 
17  Press release of 17 May 2001, JL/P.I.S./591-e, containing the full text of the speech. 
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For it to be possible to “relocate” the cases of lesser importance for the Tribunal, the 
judicial systems of the States of the former Yugoslavia had to be reconstructed on democratic 
foundations.  The national courts would have to be placed in a position to accomplish their 
work with total independence and impartiality and with due regard for the principles 
governing international humanitarian law and the protection of human rights.  This would 
suppose, among other things, that under the aegis of the representatives of the international 
community in the Balkans, judges or international observers were sent to participate in or be 
present at the trials of war criminals and that existing training programmes for local judges be 
expanded.  President Jorda told the Security Council that he was aware that the process of 
judicial reconstruction was making good progress.  The International Tribunal was prepared 
to make its contribution and be willing to reflect on what amendments to the rules of 
procedure and evidence would be implied by a redefinition of the relationship between the 
International Tribunal and national courts, or indeed any means in the processes of national 
reconciliation.18  He had already voiced these ideas before the General Assembly on 26 
November 2001.19  The topic was also addressed by Carla del Ponte, the ICTY Prosecutor, in 
her speech to the Security Council on 27 November 2001.20 
In January 2002, the President, Prosecutor and Registrar created a working group 
whose mission was to examine the problems which might arise through the implementation 
of the process of referring certain cases.  In February 2002, they addressed a joint letter to the 
United Nations Secretary-General  informing him of this initiative. 
On 28 February 2002, Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes 
Issues in the United States Department of State, and himself a former staff member of the 
Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTR, had already upped the ante in  a speech before the 
Committee on International Relations of the United States House of Representatives. He was 
pushing the new Bush Administration’s intention to wind down the two tribunals as quickly 
as possible, by saying, not always very diplomatically: 
 
The United States remains proud of its leadership in 
supporting the two ad hoc Tribunals and will continue to do 
so in the future.  Their work is important and has greatly 
contributed to justice for the victims of war crimes and to 
ending impunity for those who would orchestrate and 
commit genocide. … These efforts show that the Tribunals 
are on the path to success.  However, despite these 
achievements, we recognize that there have been problems 
that challenge the integrity of the process. In both 
Tribunals, … the process, at times, has been costly, has 
lacked efficiency, has been too slow, and has been too 
removed from the everyday experience of the people and 
the victims. …  [T]he goal of this Administration is to see 
the Tribunals reach a successful conclusion.  That means 
the Tribunals need to remain within the spirit of the 
 
18  Press release of 27 November 2001, JD/P.I.S./641-e, containing the full text of the speech. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Ibid. 
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founding resolutions and pursue those who bear the greatest 
responsibility. …  [T]he Tribunals were not established to 
judge each and every violation of law that occurred during 
the conflicts.  And they were not designed to completely 
usurp the authority and, more importantly, the 
responsibility of sovereign states. In establishing these 
organs, the Security Council clearly envisioned the shared 
responsibility of local governments to adjudicate some of 
these serious violations. And it is this shared responsibility 
that will lead us to the successful conclusion we seek.  As a 
result, this Administration is … urging both Tribunals to 
begin to aggressively focus on the end-game and conclude 
their work by 2007-2008, a timeframe that we have stressed 
and to which officials from both Tribunals have referred.  
We are calling on the regional states to do their part: to 
cooperate fully with the Tribunals' investigations and 
prosecutions.  We are aggressively engaging the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia 
at the highest levels to remind them of their international 
obligation to transfer all at-large indictees to The Hague. …  
We are also pressing the governments in the former 
Yugoslavia to accept their responsibility, … to hold 
accountable the mid and lower level perpetrators.  The 
lower level perpetrators in both of these regions do not get 
a free pass.  We do not want to see an abandonment of the 
state responsibility and are encouraging appropriate 
domestic judicial and administrative action. …  For this … 
cause to be successful, … the international community, the 
Tribunals, and the regional states must coordinate, accept 
their role and individual responsibility, and go down this 
arduous road together. …  In … creating an environment 
where there is not a dependency on international 
mechanisms we will bring justice to the victims and restore 
confidence in domestic institutions in societies throughout 
the world.21 
 
President Jorda took this criticism in stride when Prosper and the U.S. Ambassadors in the 
Hague, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo visited the ICTY on 6 March 2002, by expressing his 
pleasure at the United States’ support for the reforms undertaken by the ICTY.22 
In March and April 2002, the President, Prosecutor and Registrar met with the 
members of the OHR responsible for reforming the judicial system, and together they 
formulated a plan of action.  At an extraordinary plenary session on 23 April 2002 they 
 
21  Available at <www.house.gov/international_relations/107/pros0228.htm> (last accessed on 6 April 
2003). 
22  Press release of 6 March 2002, JdH/P.I.S./662-e. 
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reported to the Judges of the ICTY, assembled to discuss the completion strategy for the 
mandate of the Tribunal.23  The President recalled that the report was consistent with the 
programme that the Prosecutor and he had presented to the United Nations Security Council 
in November 2001.  In keeping with the goal of focussing on the persons responsible for the 
most serious violations of international humanitarian law, the report examined the possibility 
of referring cases involving intermediate-level alleged perpetrators to the domestic courts.  
The Tribunal intended to satisfy itself beforehand that the domestic courts were operating 
with full respect for the principles of humanitarian law and the protection of human rights.  
Amongst the solutions the report recommended were the establishment of a chamber at the 
envisaged State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina with specific jurisdiction to try war crimes 
suspects.  Additionally, the report also proposed the appointment of international judges or 
observers to the State Court, and provision of training in international humanitarian law to the 
local judiciary and court personnel.24 
 
II. THE OHR REPORT OF MAY 2002 
 
The consultants, Peter Bach, Kjell Björnberg, John Ralston and former ICTY judge 
Almiro Rodrigues, had been retained in order to examine the issues and make 
recommendations for future war crimes prosecutions to take place in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The OHR provided the consultants with a large number of reports.25.  In 
addition, the consultants reviewed relevant existing legislation and draft legislation.26  They 
held meetings with representatives of organisations, institutions or organs of government at 
the State level, in the Federation, Republika Srpska and in the Brcko District.  Similarly they 
met with representatives of various international organisations, including UNMIBH, involved 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with representatives of the ICTY. 
The ICTY was seeking to identify a trustworthy domestic court that it is willing to 
transfer cases to.  A figure of up to seventeen cases involving fifty accused had been 
mentioned in this context.  Under the Rules of the Road programme there were already 
potentially up to 300 cases which could be prosecuted locally.  The International Crisis 
Group (ICG) identified an additional sixty-three alleged war criminals not indicted by the 
ICTY nor necessarily mentioned in Rules of the Road files.  At least half did not even appear 
to be under investigation, and all enjoyed some degree of control in their home 
municipalities.  These cases were likely to be highly sensitive, and it was questionable 
whether they could be conducted at the local level.  Local police investigations and 
prosecutions were criticised as ethnically biased, subject to improper influence by officials 
and criminals alike, and not professionally investigated, prosecuted or adjudicated. 
As reported by the International Crisis Group, war crimes in one entity or canton were 
still hailed as acts of heroism in another.  Further, it was stated that the ICTY’s ability to try 
 
23  See para. 6 of the “Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts, June 2002”, available on 
the ICTY website as an appendix to the press release of 20 June 2000, SB/P.I.S./512-e. 
24  Press release of 24 April 2002, JdH/P.I.S./671-3. 
25  “Consultants’ Report to the OHR, The Future of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, May 2002, Annex 5.  An electronic copy with full annexes is on file with the author.  
Citations are to the pages of the report. 
26  Ibid., Annex 6. 
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only major war crimes cases means that hundreds if not thousands of war crimes suspects 
would have to be tried in Bosnian courts if they were to be tried at all.  Those courts must be 
made fit to handle this delicate assignment.  The current practice of trying indicted war 
criminals in cantonal or entity courts had proved inadequate.  Justice had neither been done 
nor been seen to be done.  Trials were regarded as occasions for dispensing “ethnic” justice 
or exacting revenge.  Moreover, such trials were politically explosive, especially as various 
past and present national leaders were among those indicted or likely to be indicted.27 
The report recalled that the ICTY had developed a project proposal regarding the 
remission of some cases to a special court in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Before presentation of 
the proposal to the United Nations Security Council on 26 November 2001, the ICTY 
Prosecutor had presented it to the OHR, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers (COM).  The 
proposal was welcomed by the three bodies as an opportunity to expedite war crimes 
prosecutions, enhance the work of the ICTY and contribute to judicial reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  All three agencies had agreed that the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
appeared to be the most appropriate institution for the prosecution of war crimes cases.   
The consultants examined various models for the conduct of war crimes cases, 
including the Federation Cantonal Courts, District Courts in the Republika Srpska, the entity 
Supreme Courts and the Brcko District Court.  They also considered establishing a special 
court (“mini-Hague”), a special court in each entity or a special state level court.  As the draft 
law on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina established a criminal division, the consultants 
also examined whether the establishment of an international humanitarian law chamber or 
division in this Court would be the best option.  
The main issues were: 
 
• political and other influence of the proceedings; 
• serious concerns about the independence of the judiciary; 
• widespread concerns over impartiality and ethnic bias; 
• doubts that mono-ethnic courts can deliver impartial judgements; 
• objections to cantonal or district courts having a role as that would be open 
to influence at local level; 
• cases against some of the more notorious offenders would never happen if 
left to local authorities;  
• little confidence that investigations would be conducted efficiently, 
effectively or impartially;  
• questions of competence and failure to meet international legal standards; 
• lack of suitable infrastructure and financial support to conduct trials of this 
nature;  
• need for a mixed judiciary representing the three main ethnic groups in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
• protection of witnesses; 
• security of personnel, premises and information security;   
• lack of inter-entity and intra-entity co-operation in war crimes cases;  
 
27  Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
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• unlikelihood of arrests of persons accused of war crimes, especially when 
residing in the other entity;  
• verdicts from courts in one entity not likely to be recognised in the other 
entity, verdicts of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina not likely to be 
recognised in either entity; 
• the need to harmonise local law and practice with ICTY rules and 
jurisprudence, particularly with regard to command responsibility; and 
• securing adequate funding. 
 
The majority of the persons interviewed from the Federation and the international 
community observed that cases would not be conducted with sufficient quality without 
international participation, which was even accepted by some from the Republika Srpska.  
Most agreed that it would be positive to have cases prosecuted in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
This would raise confidence in local institutions and raise awareness of the overall issues 
involved.  In meetings with the representatives of the Federation, there was considerable 
support for a special court to deal with war crimes cases.  There was some digression as to 
whether it should be at the state or entity level, but most favoured a state-level court and felt 
that an international humanitarian law division within the Criminal Division of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina would be a suitable solution.  In the Republika Srpska there was 
support for special courts to deal with cases at the entity level.  The representatives were 
against a state-level court and questioned whether a state court could have constitutional 
competence to prosecute war crimes cases.  There was also a strong desire for the venue of 
cases to be determined by the locality in which the crime took place, and not where the 
victims resided.  Existing structures should be used, with monitors. A separate court beyond 
the current system would mean loss of confidence in domestic courts.  The international 
community clearly favoured a state-level solution28. 
The consultants recommended the establishment of an international humanitarian law 
(IHL) division within the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This division, composed of both 
an appeals chamber and one or more trial chamber was to bear overall responsibility for the 
conduct of cases involving serious violations of IHL in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It would 
have national and international judges. One of the international judges should be elected 
president of the IHL division.29  The consultants proposed that the IHL division be 
freestanding from the Criminal Division and any possible Special Organised Crime, 
Economic Crime and Corruption Division, although administratively it would be a part of the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and have the advantage of shared personnel, equipment, 
etc.  They also said that an IHL state prosecutor’s office should be established. 
Referring to the jurisprudence of the Bosnian Constitutional Court, the consultants 
were of the opinion that the establishment of such a division was not in contravention with 
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The legislation on the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina would have to be amended and provisions for the proceedings in these cases 
included in the State Criminal Procedure Code.  The consultants said that the IHL division 
should be entitled to establish its own Book of Rules. 
 
28  Ibid., pp. 8-10. 
29  Ibid., p. 12. 
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Given the potentially high number of war crimes cases, the IHL division would not be 
able to deal with all cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving a role for entity-level courts.  
The IHL division would need the ability to transfer cases to cantonal courts in the Federation, 
district courts in the Republika Srpska and the Brcko District Court where appropriate.  The 
trial chamber should be able to do this after the filing of the indictment; prior to that it would 
be the responsibility of the IHL prosecutor.  The consultants said that IHL division should 
also have a supervisory role with regard to such prosecutions within the entities, and that the 
IHL prosecutor should monitor trials conducted at the entity level.  On the motion of the 
Prosecutor, a trial chamber should be empowered to recall a case from the entity court if the 
case was not conducted in a manner consistent with international standards.30 
 
2.1 The chambers 
 
The sensitivity of cases, and concerns that they will be decided along ethnic lines, 
dictate a multi-ethnic composition of the court, the prosecutor’s office and the investigation 
wing, to ensure impartiality.  International participation in all parts of the judicial procedure 
was thought to be inevitable if an acceptable standard of the proceedings was to be reached.  
A system consisting of a mixture of international and national personnel was preferred to one 
with purely international personnel.  It was thought this would give the system higher public 
credibility and recognition, and would also be an opening for the creation, in the long run, of 
a purely national system of handling war crimes cases. 
The consultants considered many different options in determining the composition of the 
trial chamber panels.  Four main features were identified as necessary: 
 
• a multi-ethnic panel to minimise complaints of ethnic bias; 
• international representation to ensure impartiality and that trials are 
conducted according to international standards;  
• an uneven number of judges to avoid deadlocked panels; and 
• an effective working composition of judges. 
 
This led, in the final analysis, to two possible models: a trial panel composed of two 
national judges from different ethnic groups and one international judge; or a trial panel 
composed of three national judges from different ethnic groups and two international judges.  
The first option was strongly supported, but considered problematic because one or more of 
the constituent groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be represented.  The second 
option was less than ideal because five judges are considered too many to hear a trial in first 
instance.  The consultants, however, proposed nevertheless that a trial chamber within the 
division should consist of five judges, three of whom would be nationals, each from a 
different ethnic group, with two international appointments, and that a panel should consist of 
either all judges in the chamber or three judges, including one international.  Initially it was 
recommended that one trial chamber be established.  If the volume of work demanded and 
funding was available, additional trial chambers could be created31. 
 
30  Ibid., pp. 10-12. 
31  Ibid., p. 12. 
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The IHL appeals chamber would ultimately hear appeals on decisions of the IHL trial 
chamber.  For an accused whose trial for war crimes took place in a Federation Cantonal 
Court, a District Court in Republika Srpska or the Brcko District Court, the avenue of appeal 
would be to the IHL trial chamber.  Appeals from either the IHL trial chamber to the IHL 
appeals chamber or from the entity level courts to the IHL trial chamber would be limited to 
matters involving errors on a question of law invalidating the decision and errors of fact 
occasioning a miscarriage of justice. 
It was not recommended that the appeals chamber hear appeals directly from the cantonal 
and district courts, as it was assumed that the number of appeals from the local courts could 
be overwhelming.  The consultants also considered that the IHL trial chamber should be of a 
higher rank within the judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina than the cantonal and district 
courts.  However, it was deemed necessary to ensure consistency in the application of 
international humanitarian law throughout all courts, something that suggested a single 
appellate court in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  To secure this aim, a review mechanism, similar 
to that of extraordinary remedies, was proposed for appeals to the IHL appeals chamber.  A 
single judge of the appeals chamber would be entitled to grant leave to appeal a decision of 
the trial chamber in relation to an appeal in a case tried in first instance by a local court, if the 
decision was clearly inconsistent with international humanitarian law or clearly inconsistent 
with the jurisprudence of the IHL appeals chamber. 
Decisions of the appeals chamber and refusal of leave to appeal by an appeals 
chamber judge would settle cases definitively.  Cases tried after an appeal would only be sent 
back to the lower instance court to be retried if grave errors of fact had occurred.  Where a 
new fact had been discovered which was not known at the time of the proceedings and could 
have been a decisive factor in reaching judgement, a submission for review of the judgement 
could be submitted. 
The IHL appeals chamber would consist of a panel of both local and international 
judges.  The panel would be composed of at least two international and three national judges, 
the latter to include no judges from the same ethnic group.  The appeals chamber would have 
the ability also to decide on whether it would hear a matter.32 
 
32  Ibid., pp. 13-15. 
Last Exit Bosnia/Bohlander  Page 12 





                                                
Structure of Appeals33 
 
 
Appeal permitted if error 
on a question of law 
invalidating the decision 
orerror of fact 
occasioning a 
miscarriage of justice 
 
Decision of a BiH Cantonal Court or District Court 
Appeals permitted in the case of 
error on a question of law 
invalidating the decision or if  
error of fact has occasioned a 
miscarriage of justice 
 
Decision by the IHL trial chamber 
 
Decision by the IHL trial chamber 
Leave to appeal to be permitted 
(by one Judge of Appeal) only if 
decision of the IHL trial chamber 
clearly inconsistent with - 
international humanitarian law or 
with jurisprudence of the IHL 
appeals chamber 
 
Final decision by the IHL appeals 
chamber 
 
33  Ibid., Annex 8. 
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The consultants were advised that the appointment of judges in the Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina would become the responsibility of an independent High Judicial Council.  
It seemed consistent and appropriate for this mechanism to be used for the appointment of 
judges and prosecutors to the IHL division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The 
vetting procedure would be demanding and call for deep consultation with a number of 
actors, domestic as well as international.  The consultants considered that the involvement of 
international judges would only be necessary for such a period of time as necessary to 
develop standards to a level consistent with those expected by the international and national 
community.  There should be provisions regarding the duration of the international 
component.  A period of five years from the date the IHL division became operational was 
recommended. 
To be eligible for appointment as a judge, national members would have to possess 
considerable judicial experience.  Their main area of expertise should be criminal law.  For 
appointment as an international member of a panel, similar criteria should apply, together 
with international criminal law experience.  Previous experience as a Senior Legal Adviser or 
Senior Trial Attorney with the ICTY or International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
could qualify a person for appointment.  International judges would be appointed on 
conditions consistent with those for international judges in other courts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Judges appointed from within Bosnia and Herzegovina should receive the 
same emoluments as their national counterparts in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina34. 
 
2.2 Types of Cases 
 
The consultants were unable to obtain reliable data as to the number of cases likely to 
confront the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Whether a case would be dealt with seems 
ultimately to depend upon what its characteristics are.  The consultants identified four types 
of cases, although the lines between the various categories can be quite blurred.  
“Leadership” cases should remain with the ICTY, the consultants believed.  They 
were characterised as follows: complex matters involving high-level accused, e.g., political, 
military and police officials; case involving high levels of victimisation, occurring in a 
continuing way over an extended period of time and larger geographical areas; and cases 
more likely than not dealing with the complex issue of command responsibility.35 
Cases of “mid-level offenders, egregious cases or notorious offenders” would involve 
people who had less significant leadership roles, but who were accused of particularly 
egregious or notorious acts.  This group would include military, para-military, police and 
political figures at a local level, now generally considered notorious war criminals by one 
ethnic group and war heroes by another.  It would also include cases where it is clear that an 
entity-level court would not have the ability to deal with a notorious offender.  Also included 
in this group would be cases involving persons accused of crimes both in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in other territories of the former Yugoslavia36. 
 
34  Ibid.,. pp. 15-16. 
35  Ibid., p. 16. 
36  Ibid. 
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A third category, which would occasionally require separate considerations, related to 
crimes of sexual violence37. 
The fourth type of cases would involve “lower-level accused”, accused of isolated 
offences, and cases which were not of a complex nature, generally relying on eye-witness 
testimony which establishes whether or not the accused committed some individual acts 
falling within the ambit of serious violations of international humanitarian law38. 
Currently identified “Rules of the Road” cases could fall within any of the above 
categories. 
The consultants considered whether it was necessary to limit the scope of war crimes 
proceedings, applying a strategy similar to the ICTY, concentrating only on the more serious 
cases, or whether there should also be a time-line according to which domestic war crimes 
proceedings should be completed.  There is no statute of limitation for war crimes in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  The consultants were of the view that this was appropriate and that there 
should not be any time limitation in which cases should be heard, nor should there be any 
limitation as to the level of cases which could be prosecuted39.  
 
2.3 The prosecutor 
  
The consultants proposed that a separate IHL state prosecutor’s be established within 
the envisaged state prosecutor’s office, connected to the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and that relevant regulation should be included in a law on the state prosecutor.  The IHL 
prosecutor would be responsible for cases referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina by the ICTY 
and investigation and prosecution of other cases involving mid-level offenders, egregious 
cases or notorious offenders, and cases involving allegations of sexual violence.  Lower-level 
offenders could be dealt with either in the IHL division or, when so decided by the IHL 
prosecutor, in lower-level courts. 
The IHL prosecutor would decide which cases would be pursued in the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and which cases would be pursued at the entity level.  The IHL 
prosecutor would have a supervisory role in relation to entity prosecutors when they are 
involved in war crimes investigations or prosecutions.  According to the consultants, the first 
IHL prosecutor should be an international.  He or she should be assisted by deputy 
prosecutors as required.  Wherever possible there should be deputy prosecutors from different 
ethnic groups.  The prosecutor should also have an international deputy appointed to be 
responsible for appeals.  In due course, for instance after five years, national appointments 
should replace both. 
The IHL prosecutor should be independent of all domestic and international bodies, 
and stand free from, and at the same level as, the regular Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Prosecutor.  The composition of the IHL prosecutor’s office should reflect the ethnic make-
up of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  A state-wide parallel to the already existing system in the 
Federation that empowers the Prosecutor to decide which Cantonal Prosecutor should handle 
a case, if this question arises, should be created.  Thus, the IHL prosecutor would have the 
discretion to decide which court should deal with a case.  In making these decisions the 
 
37  Ibid., p. 17. 
38  Ibid. 
39  Ibid., p. 17. 
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prosecutor would have due regard to legal requirements and the type of case as set out earlier 
in this paper.  According to the consultants, the prosecutor’s decision as to venue should be 
final and binding.  Legislation would have to be amended for this to occur.  The procedures 
for appointment should be the same as for judges.   
The consultants were of the opinion that until their recommendations were fully 
implemented and operational, war crimes cases being conducted locally should continue. 
Cases should continue to be submitted to the ICTY Prosecutor, for assessment under the 
“Rules of the Road” programme according to the Rome Agreement of 1996.  Once the IHL 
division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the IHL prosecutor’s office would have 
become fully operational, the “Rules of the Road” process could be transferred to the IHL 
prosecutor.  This would be consistent with the IHL prosecutor’s function of overall 
supervision of war crimes prosecutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  It was recognised that 
initially the volume of this task might be too great for the IHL prosecutor to take over.  The 
position would therefore be reviewed once the IHL prosecutor’s office had become 
operational and a date set for the changeover.40 
 
2.4 Defence counsel 
 
It is an integral part of fair and proper trials that the accused be represented by competent 
counsel to defend his or her legal interests in court.  While an accused always has the option 
of hiring counsel, the question how to ensure that indigent accused are properly represented 
before the court arises.  The consultants suggested that the domestic tradition of court-
appointed counsel should be continued.  It was noted locally that defence counsel, appointed 
ex officio by the court, do not seem to defend accused with the same vigour as counsel hired 
directly. There may be several reasons for this but in order to ensure proper defence in the 
cases in question the consultants recommended that funds should be available to pay court 
appointed counsel through a defence trust fund; and that a public defenders support unit 
should be established.  
In order to ensure a consistent and qualified defence, it was considered necessary to 
develop a set of rules regulating, as a minimum, financial requirements for determination of 
indigent status, authority to appoint counsel; minimum professional requirements; the ability 
of an accused to object to and reject court appointed counsel; and misconduct of counsel, 
including failure to show up in court and failure to adhere to generally accepted professional 
defence standards.  A decision to refuse a request to appoint defence counsel should be 
subject to appeal.  Misconduct of counsel should, after warning, lead to refusal of  audience.  
It was envisaged that the public defenders support unit should consist of five persons of 
whom two should be internationals while the remaining three should be nationals, attorneys 
and support staff.  The consultants did not suggest that the public defenders support unit 
represent clients in court but merely provide support and advice to court-appointed defence 
attorneys regarding international humanitarian law issues, including ICTY practice.  




40  Ibid., pp.18-19. 
41  Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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2.5 The registrar 
 
The consultants recommended the establishment of a registry and appointment of a 
registrar, assisted by suitable personnel, to carry out the following functions: organisation of 
the smooth running of the chambers; registration of documents related to court proceedings; 
information systems management; archiving; assistance and technical support to the 
chambers and the prosecutor’s office; administrative control of the witness protection unit; 
administrative control of the court police; maintenance of a law library, in collaboration with 
ICTY; and language services. 
The consultants were advised that the court registries in Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
very limited competencies.  Due to the very nature of war crimes cases the consultants 
deemed it necessary to establish an independent registry for the purpose of dealing with 
numerous practical and legal aspects pertaining to handling of evidence, witnesses, etc.  They 
felt that these duties should not be the responsibility of the courts or the prosecutor’s office.  
It was proposed that the first Registrar be an international appointment.42 
 
2.6 War crimes cases within the domestic court system 
 
It was recommended that trials for war crimes of lower level accused be limited to 
nominated Cantonal or District Courts, and only as referred by the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina IHL prosecutor.  Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo, and Brcko are recommended 
for such nomination.  
At the Bosnia and Herzegovina level there is a Human Rights Chamber, a 
Constitutional Court and the above-mentioned Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is 
not yet operational.  There is international representation in both the Human Rights Chamber 
and the Constitutional Court. 
For the Federation, there are fifty-two Municipal Courts, five Cantonal Courts, a 
Supreme Court, and a Constitutional Court.  War crimes prosecutions could take place in first 
instance in Municipal Courts in some Cantons, but mostly in the Cantonal Courts.  This 
situation was deemed too complex;; there were too many courts to allow war crimes cases 
and witness protection to be dealt with in a secure and consistent manner across the entire 
court system.  It was recommended that trials for war crimes of lower level accused be 
limited to nominated Cantonal Courts, e.g., Mostar and Sarajevo, and only as referred by the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina IHL prosecutor. 
In the Republika Srpska there are twenty-five Basic Courts, five District Courts, a 
Supreme Court, and a Constitutional Court.  As with the Federation, this was considered too 
complex to allow war crimes cases and witness protection to be dealt with in a secure and 
consistent manner across the entire court system.  It was recommended that trials for war 
crimes of lower level accused be limited to one District Court, preferably Banja Luka, as 
referred by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina IHL prosecutor. 
The new judicial model in the Brcko District has a court system, which comprises a 
first instance Basic Court and a second instance Appellate Court.  The Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will be a third instance court.  It was recommended that the Brcko second 
 
42  Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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instance court deal with war crimes cases if referred by the IHL prosecutor.  Appeals would 
lie to the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina IHL division.43 
 
2.7 Bosnian law, and its relationship to the ICTY 
 
The consultants considered it preferable that, to the extent possible, the provisions set 
up in domestic legislation should serve as a basis for new or amended legislation.  When not 
sufficient, amendments to existing legislation or creation of new regulations were 
recommended.  Provisions should also take into account developments in the law as applied 
in the ICTY.  The Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Codes and Criminal 
Procedure Codes of the Federation, Republika Srpska and the Brcko District should be 
amended to include consistent provisions regarding war crimes. 
The jurisprudence of the ICTY should be persuasive authority in procedural, as well 
as criminal matters, in the interpretation of legislation by Bosnia and Herzegovina courts on 
all levels. However, the consultants realised that the differences between the legal systems 
would make an obligation for local courts to follow the jurisprudence of the Tribunal 
completely impossible.  A regulation stating that the courts should take into account the 
jurisprudence of the Tribunal was recommended.  The consultants also recommended that the 
temporal jurisdiction should commence on 1 January 1991 as with the ICTY.  The territorial 
jurisdiction should be limited to conduct within the borders now recognised as being those of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Provisions should be enacted to allow abbreviated proceedings where the accused 
admits guilt and it is in the interest of justice to limit the amount of evidence taken.  Where 
the accused has contributed substantially to expediting the proceedings, either by admitting 
guilt in his or her own case, or by providing reliable and cogent testimony in proceedings 
against others, he or she should be entitled to a substantial discount in sentence. 
Once established, the first task of the judges of the IHL division of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina would be to prepare a Book of Rules for the Chambers under the 
relevant domestic legislation.  A substantial list of changes to domestic legislation , including 
both amendments and a number of new statutes, would also be required.44 
Various rules have been implemented by the ICTY to facilitate receiving testimony in 
an efficient and effective way and to avoid the need to call multiple witnesses in some cases, 
or the same witnesses over and over again in cases against different accused.  To the extent 
possible, these measures should be adopted, according to the consultants.. 
The rights of the accused in Bosnia and Herzegovina are already guaranteed under the 
Constitution and are an integral part of domestic law.  The Bosnia and Herzegovina Criminal 
Procedure Code should, in the view of the consultants, be consistent with all the rights given 
suspects under the ICTY Rules 42 and 43.  Rule 43, for example, requires the electronic 
recording of suspect interviews.  Although this would necessitate the purchase of expensive 
recording equipment, it was felt to be warranted.  Interviews conducted in this manner should 
be admissible as evidence.  The accused should have the right to defence counsel, both at 
interview and at trial. 
 
43  Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
44  Ibid., Annex 14 (on file with the author) provides a list of the relevant legislation requiring amendment 
and the new legislation that will be required. 
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Cases involving conduct both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other republics of the 
former Yugoslavia should remain with the ICTY.  The jurisdiction of the IHL division of the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the entity courts and Brcko District court should be 
concurrent.  As set out above, the IHL prosecutor would decide at the outset whether a matter 
was to be tried in the IHL division or at the entity or Brcko level.  The IHL prosecutor would 
have the right to intervene in local proceedings under certain circumstances, in the same way 
that the ICTY can intervene in national war crimes cases.  
In the view of the consultants, provisions should be enacted to allow shortened 
proceedings where the accused admits guilt and it is in the interest of justice to limit the 
amount of evidence taken.  Where the accused has contributed substantially in expediting 
proceedings, either by admitting guilt in his or her own case, or by providing reliable and 
cogent testimony in proceedings against others, he or she should be entitled to a substantial 
reduction in sentence.  A procedure for guilty pleas does not exist in the Federation or in 
Republika Srpska.  The Federation Criminal Procedure Code contains a regulation (article 
218) to the effect that the authority conducting the procedure has a duty to gather other 
evidence even though the accused has confessed.  A similar regulation is in place in the 
Republika Srpska Criminal Procedure Code (Article 223).  This regulation is an example of 
“the principle of the material truth”, which seemed to have deep roots in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
However, the consultants opined that if the confession was clear and complete, and 
was corroborated by other evidence, further investigation should only be undertaken on the 
recommendation of the prosecutor.  In the Brcko Criminal Procedure Code (article 156), 
there are provisions on the acceptance of guilty pleas similar to those in the ICTY Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.  These should be considered.  In the IHL division of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and in entity level courts, confessions of guilt should be regarded as 
an additional piece of evidence, which together with a sufficient factual basis, establishing 
that the crime occurred and that the participation of the accused may in itself lead to a 
conviction.  The principle of the material truth at present puts on the court an obligation to 
take part very actively in the collection of evidence in a way that might at least be seen as 
having an influence on its impartiality.  With the creation of a relatively strong prosecutorial 
organisation in the Bosnia and Herzegovina criminal procedure system, the validity of the 
principle is being reassessed.45 
This is yet another example of legal colonialism, supplemented by ignorance of the 
civil law approach, by representatives of the common law systems, as it is clearly intended to 
steer the judiciary towards embracing an adversarial model of some kind.  A French judge 
who worked in Kosovo has criticised the phenomenon, as he saw it in action there, 
challenging the massive influence of American lawyers “[i]gnorant superbement la tradition 
juridique continentale et voulant imposer leurs propres standards”.46 
 
2.8 Protective measures for witnesses 
 
The consultants recommended the adoption of a wide range of protective measures for 
witnesses involved in war crimes cases, to be based on a threat assessment.  Psychosocial 
 
45  Ibid., pp. 22-25. 
46  PATRICE DE CHARETTE, LES OISEAUX NOIRS DU KOSOVO, UN JUGE A PRISTINA 50-51 (2002). 
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support for witnesses was recommended.  The implementation of these measures would 
require the establishment of a professional witness protection and support unit.  Robust 
criminal sanctions should also be in place to deal with any attempts to interfere with 
witnesses. 
Pre-trial protective measures would include: ensuring during the investigation process 
that it is not widely known that a witness has participated in an investigation; non-disclosure 
of the name and address of the witness until shortly before proceedings; orders not to 
interfere with witnesses; orders for defendants and their legal counsel not to disclose the 
identity of witnesses; notification of local police officials that a witness is under threat, 
(provided there is a clear commitment to respond urgently to any overt threats received by the 
witness); use of electronic devices within the witness’s home or work place, to alert police in 
cases of emergency; close personal protection in extreme cases; various forms of relocation 
(temporary or permanent) until the nature of the threat subsides; other measures as 
appropriate. 
Once a trial commences, protective measures, similar to those utilised in the ICTY, 
could be adopted.  The aim of these measures would be to create a regime where members of 
the public and officials alike would become aware that any improper interference with the 
judicial process would not be tolerated.47 
It appears probable that witnesses in war crimes cases will be called from either 
entity.  Often, witnesses from one ethnic group would be called for the prosecution and from 
another group for the defence. There have been numerous reports of extreme difficulties in 
summoning witnesses across entity boundaries, and for the Brcko District from either entity.  
Measures are needed to address this.  The present agreements or regulations on inter-entity 
co-operation and co-operation with the Brcko District were not considered sufficient for the 
purpose of handling war crimes cases.  Without a legal obligation for full co-operation, there 
would be no substantial basis for advancing war crimes cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
There should not only be an obligation on judicial co-operation and co-operation for other 
official agencies with the judiciary, but also strong legal remedies for those not fulfilling the 
obligations.  According to the consultants, new agreements involving the state as well as the 
entities and the Brcko District should be negotiated which would guarantee fully effective co-
operation48. 
 
2.9 Issues regarding transfer of cases 
 
The consultants were of the opinion that a formula must be established for remitting 
cases from the ICTY to the IHL division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This could 
include a joint consideration by the ICTY Prosecutor and the IHL prosecutor, taking into 
account factors such as: complexity of the case; witness availability and the number of 
witnesses who reside outside Bosnia and Herzegovina; whether substantial issues in the case 
have already been resolved in the ICTY; command responsibility issues involved in the case; 
local factors which may affect decisions on venue; possible delays in commencing the trial 
and whether the accused would receive an earlier trial at ICTY; remaining investigative 
 
47  “Consultants’ Report to the OHR, The Future of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, supra note 25, pp. 25-28. 
48  Ibid., pp. 28-29. 
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activity before trial can commence; measures necessary to ensure that remitted cases would 
be carried out in a manner acceptable to ICTY; whether the case raises issues of territorial 
jurisdiction, for example, if the accused is alleged to have committed crimes in other 
republics of the former Yugoslavia. 
The accused should also be entitled to make submissions on whether his or her case 
should be remitted to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The final decision would rest with a Judge of 
a Trial Chamber of the ICTY.  The question was raised as to whether a facilitating agreement 
between the ICTY and Bosnia and Herzegovina would be necessary for cases to be 
transferred to the IHL division.  As the ICTY and Bosnia and Herzegovina have concurrent 
jurisdiction with regard to prosecution of war crimes cases, and further, having regard to 
proposed amendments to the Rule 11bis of the ICTY’s Rules of Evidence and Procedure, it 
was felt that a facilitating agreement would not be necessary to allow a transfer to take place. 
The ICTY proposed that after arrest of an accused it had indicted, the case could be 
suspended and transferred to a court in Bosnia and Herzegovina for trial. Reaching the 
indictment stage signalled the starting point for trials in both the ICTY and in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The standard for reaching an indictment at the ICTY appeared to be similar to 
that which will be required in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This led the consultants 
to the conclusion that if the ICTY were to transfer a case after indictment, it would be at a 
similar stage to a case after indictment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  A significant issue to be 
resolved related to the material to be provided by the ICTY to the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina when a case was referred to it.  It was anticipated that along with the accused 
and the indictment, the ICTY would forward the Prosecutor’s pre-trial brief,49 witness lists 
and statements, exhibit lists and exhibits, including documentary evidence, video evidence, 
photographs and other physical evidence, depositions of witnesses who have given evidence 
in other trials involving the same facts or before presiding officer, and judicial decisions 
regarding those facts. 
There was considerable concern whether the material gathered by the ICTY would be 
admissible before a court in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  National judges and prosecutors were 
said not to be used to receiving cases in this format and would require considerable guidance 
on how to use the materials, and legislative action might be required in order to facilitate this.  
At a minimum, judicial guidelines would need to be prepared to assist the judiciary in 
determining these questions.  Confidentiality issues relating to material obtained by the ICTY 
would have to be addressed, particularly where evidence emanated from material provided 
under Rule 70 of the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, which concerns evidence not 
subject to disclosure.50 
 
 
49  This would appear to be at odds with the procedural sequence at the ICTY, because the pre-trial brief is 
filed by the Prosecutor only close to the trial date.  If the time of decision is the indictment stage, there 
will usually be no pre-trial brief, and the prosecution before the Bosnian court may well form 
completely different views on the facts and the law than the ICTY prosecutors.  
50  “Consultants’ Report to the OHR, The Future of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, supra note 25, pp. 30-32. 
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2.10 Investigations, arrests, sentences and their enforcement 
 
It was recommended that an investigations unit be established within the Prosecutor’s 
Office to carry out war crimes investigations.  The investigations unit should be free of the 
constraints currently hindering inter-entity co-operation.  In short, it would have to be capable 
of conducting investigations and other related tasks across the whole of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, irrespective of where the activity is to take place.  The proposed court will not 
function without a mechanism to enforce its decisions.  Therefore, the consultants 
recommended the establishment of a court police, similar to the system operating in the 
Federation, for execution of orders of the court for attendance of witnesses, arrest of accused 
and persons to be sentenced, and maintenance of order and security in the courtroom and in 
the court premises.51  The consultants also recommended that sentences be served in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  Such sentences should be in accordance with the applicable law of the 
entity where the sentence is served, subject to the supervision of the trial or appeals chamber 
of the IHL division.52 
 
2.11 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
 
The relationship between the IHL division and the proposed Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) was said to be difficult to define.  The purpose of the TRC is to provide a 
forum for victims to tell their story and to establish, without apportioning guilt, the horrific 
events, which occurred in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  If the experience of 
previous similar commissions could be a guide, disclosures at the TRC would precipitate 
calls for judicial action concerning certain events.  Further, matters that would come to light 
in the TRC might well be forwarded to the IHL prosecutor for investigation, or alternatively, 
the IHL prosecutor might deem it his or her responsibility to track TRC proceedings and 
initiate investigations where warranted.  From either perspective this could increase the work 
of the IHL prosecutor and ultimately increase the work of the IHL division.53 
 
2.12 Budget and funding  
 
When examining the various options for the establishment of the IHL division, the 
consultants found that there were essentially two hypotheses.  A “best case scenario,” where 
the proposed budget and model was adopted in full, and was fully funded, and a “modest but 
will suffice” version, based on either the deletion of certain elements or their acquisition at 
below cost.  Detailed budgets and funding requirements were outlined for each of these 
scenarios.54  The cost of the first option was calculated at €4,818,000 to establish and then 
€6,532,650 to run the IHL division for the first year.  If three trial panels were established 
instead of one, the cost would increase to approximately €11,632,450 per year.  The cost 
estimates are adjustable.  The single most expensive cost is establishment of the infrastructure 
of courtrooms, office space and computer networks.  Starting from scratch, offices, court 
 
51  Ibid., pp. 32-34. 
52  Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
53  Ibid., p. 37. 
54  Ibid., Annex 4 (on file with the author). 
Last Exit Bosnia/Bohlander  Page 22 





                                                
modification costs, information technology and office equipment would total approximately 
€6 million. 
The other large item was salaries for international staff.  In order to attract competent 
and dedicated professionals, preferably for a medium to long-term period, salaries would 
have to be internationally competitive.  On the other hand, seconded staff could reduce the 
need for external funding.  However, in order to ensure continuity and strong leadership the 
consultants strongly recommended keeping seconded staff to a minimum and ensuring that 
funding was in place for at least all top-level international employees before the process is 
initiated.  With regard to national staff, the budget was based on salary scales for nationals 
employed by international organisations.  This was obviously higher than what public 
officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina were paid.  However without significant financial 
incentives it is open to question whether the IHL division would be able to attract proper and 
qualified professionals.55 
 
2.13 Implementation  
 
The consultants prepared a proposed time line for implementation of these 
recommendations that projected the start of the first trial within 180 days.56  As preliminaries, 
the OHR would have to establish a management board with the participation of 
representatives of stakeholders, securing of adequate funding, and appointment of a project 
manager.  Crucial components that would also have to be in place before this process could 
begin would include enactment of legal provisions to establish and operate the IHL division, 
including adoption of new legislation as amendments of relevant laws (Law on the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Codes, Criminal Procedure Codes, Laws on Prosecutors 
and other legislation).  Suitable premises would have to be acquired. 
 
III. THE ICTY REPORT OF JUNE 2002 
 
The ICTY Report of June 2002,57 in which – despite the obvious involvement of 
ICTY staff in its preparation and the developments prior to the ICTY report – the President 
declared that the OHR report of May 2002 had not been taken into account,58 dealt with a 
number of problems related to the functioning of the ICTY, and especially with the deferral 
of cases to courts in Bosnia.  The ICTY acknowledged the gradual restoration of democratic 
institutions in Bosnia and the increase in the number of arrests of high-ranking accused, and, 
while in the beginning the referral of cases to the courts in the former Yugoslavia was 
inconceivable, partly because some of them were still at war, that with the return to peace and 
the reforms of the judicial systems, implementation of a referral process was said to be an 
“increasingly likely prospect”.59  The Tribunal emphasised the need to ensure that the 
 
55  Ibid., pp.40-41. 
56  Ibid., Annex 13 (on file with the author). 
57  “Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts”, available on the ICTY website as an 
appendix to the press release of 20 June 2000, SB/P.I.S./512-e. 
58  Ibid., para. 59. 
59  Ibid., para. 2. 
Last Exit Bosnia/Bohlander  Page 23 





                                                
national courts had the necessary resources for taking on such cases and that they operate 
fairly and with respect for the principles of international humanitarian law and the protection 
of human rights.60 
The report was split into two main parts, a statistical evaluation of the activity of the 
Office of the Prosecutor and the Chambers, in order to determine the scope of the referral 
process, and a presentation of the main obstacles to the referral of cases to the national courts 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the necessary reforms in order to overcome them.61  The first 
part is not discussed here, because it only set out the reasons why the ICTY had to consider 
referral and how many cases could be referred. 
The ICTY estimated that several persons detained by the Tribunal and possibly fifty 
potential future defendants could be referred to national courts.  They were mainly persons 
who had held intermediate-level positions between the principal military and political leaders 
indicted and tried by the Tribunal and the low-ranking subordinates indicted and tried by the 
national courts.  Pursuant to the terms of the Rome Agreement of 18 February 1996, by June 
2000, the Prosecutor had received 1,266 files concerning 4,045 suspects from the local 
authorities, and had examined approximately 700 files concerning about 2,500 suspects.62  
“Intermediary-level accused” according to the Report, in a somewhat circular definition, 
meant those in a position of authority sufficiently high-ranking to warrant being indicted by 
the Prosecutor of the Tribunal - and accordingly, the indictment would be issued by the ICTY 
Prosecutor and confirmed by a Judge of the Tribunal – and who could be tried by national 
courts provided that the national courts comply fully with internationally recognised 
standards of human rights and due process.63 
The ICTY recalled64 the words of the Secretary-General’s report of 3 May 1993 that: 
“it was not the intention of the Security Council to preclude or prevent the exercise of 
jurisdiction by national courts with respect to [serious violations of international 
humanitarian law]. Indeed national courts should be encouraged to exercise their jurisdiction 
in accordance with their relevant national laws and procedures”.65  It also referred to the 
Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court “that it is the duty of every 
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes” and 
“that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not 
go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by enhancing international cooperation”.  
The implementation of the referral process was considered to require amendments to 
the Statute and a reformulation of Rule 11bis of the Rules, and possibly the signing of a co-
operation agreement between the Tribunal and the national authorities.66  At the 
extraordinary plenary session of 23 April 2002, the Judges had noted that the Statute 
contained some ambiguities as to the extent of the Tribunal’s power to refer cases to national 
 
60  Ibid., para. 4. 
61  Ibid., para. 9. 
62  Ibid., para. 31. 
63  Ibid., para. 32. 
64  Ibid., para. 33. 
65  “Report of the Secretary-General established pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 
808 (1993)’, 3 May 1993, UN Doc. S/25704, para. 64. 
66  “Report on the Judicial Status of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
Prospects for Referring Certain Cases to National Courts”,  supra note 57, para. 35. 
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courts.  They suggested that the Security Council resolve the issue by passing a resolution 
amending the Statute.  They were not certain whether the provisions of article 29 of the 
Statute - which impose on all the member States a general obligation to co-operate with the 
Tribunal - could be interpreted as allowing the Tribunal to compel national courts to try the 
persons who would be referred, whilst respecting the indictments issued by the Prosecutor.  
Nor was it clear that article 9 of the Statute - which establish the principles of concurrent 
jurisdiction and the primacy of the Tribunal - could be interpreted as authorising the Tribunal 
to implement a more far-reaching referral process than the one set out in the Rules at the 
time.  The current version of Rule 11bis of the Rules made provision only for the suspension 
of an indictment, under certain conditions, if the case was pending before the
To implement a truly effective referral process, the judges thought that the scope of 
the application of this Rule had to be broadened,67 with several aims, including allowing 
certain cases to be referred to the courts of the State on whose territory the crimes were 
committed,68 authorising the referral of cases involving accused not in the custody of the 
Tribunal69 and making it possible for the Tribunal to ensure that the accused be tried by 
national courts for all the crimes specified in the indictments.70  The Rule should also enable 
the Tribunal to compel the national judicial authorities to respect the protective measures 
ordered for victims and witnesses.71  The Rules is were at that time silent as to the level of 
responsibility required for an accused to be prosecuted in a national court.  It was 
acknowledged that this level was not easy to determine in the abstract, particularly in the 
context of a conflict which involved both leaders of States or autonomous entities and civilian 
and paramilitary groups.  However, for reasons of transparency vis-à-vis the international 
community and, more particularly, the States of the former Yugoslavia, in addition to the 
ability of the national courts to conform to international standards, the Tribunal wanted to 
take into consideration the position of the accused and the gravity of the crimes with which 
they were charged.  It was to be for the Tribunal to assess and set out in concreto the main 
points of those criteria.72  The Judges also wanted the Rule to authorise the competent Trial 
Chamber to decide ex officio to refer a case after having given the Prosecutor and, where 
applicable, the accused the opportunity to be heard. 
The Prosecutor objected to the fact that a Trial Chamber could decide ex officio to 
refer a case, as this would infringe upon the powers conferred on her by the Statute.  
However, Rule 11bis of the Rules current at the time already gave a Trial Chamber the right 
to act ex officio.73  The Prosecutor believed at the time that Bosnia was the only country that 
could be considered for the referral process.74 
The report briefly described the steps the authorities of Bosnia  had taken with respect 
to reforming their judicial system, namely incorporating violations of the law of war into the 
criminal codes, bringing the codes of criminal procedure into line with international 
conventions on the protection of human rights, reinforcing the procedural guarantees during 
 
67  Ibid., para. 37. 
68  Ibid., para. 38. 
69  Ibid., para. 39. 
70  Ibid., para. 40. 
71  Ibid., para. 41. 
72  Ibid., para. 42. 
73  Ibid., para. 43. 
74  Ibid., para. 45. 
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the preliminary investigation, judicial examination and trial, harmonising the rules of 
evidence with the requirements of a fair trial, adopting measures to guarantee the status and 
independence of the judiciary, and adopting a code of professional conduct for the 
judiciary.75 
The report described the main obstacles to referral proceedings: risk of dependency and 
partiality of the judiciary; lack or ineffectiveness of witness protection provisions; lack of 
training of the judiciary and law professionals; insufficient financial and logistical resources; 
slowness of the judicial system; incomplete compatibility of national substantive law with 
international law.76  According to the report, these obstacles could be overcome in several 
ways.  The local judges, prosecutors and court personnel could receive additional training in 
international criminal law and human rights.  International judges could be sent to serve in 
national courts.  International observers to oversee the conduct of the trials and, where need 
be, advise the judiciary could also be sent.  More fundamentally, several aspects of the 
judicial system could be restructured.77 
The respective advantages and disadvantages of the various solutions were 
summarised as follows in the following table78:  
 
Overview of the different solutions 
 
Possible solutions  Main advantages  Main disadvantages Comparison of the main 
advantages and disadvantages 
Use of the current national 
system together with 
training of the local 
judiciary in international 
criminal law 
The solution  
 
1. makes it possible to use the 
law and criminal procedure in 
force; 
2. avoids the difficulties linked 
to implementing a reform of 
the judicial system; 
3. ensures substantial support 
for the court personnel; 




1. does not encourage the 
efforts to reform the judicial 
institution; 
2. limits the action taken to a 




1. Training the local judiciary is 
a worthwhile step since it offers 
a further guarantee of 
professionalism and, therefore, 
contributes towards bolstering 
the public’s feeling of confidence 
in its judicial system. 
2. Nonetheless, the proposed 
training of the judiciary will not 
in itself suffice to respond to the 
inherent requirements of the very 
specific context of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. For example, it 
does not make it possible to 
resolve the difficulties linked to 
the compartmentalisation of the 
judicial systems, which will 
nonetheless have to be overcome 
if war crimes are to be punished 
effectively in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
Use of the current system 





1. The sending of international 
observers could, in the long term, 
                                                 
75  Ibid., para. 48. 
76  Ibid., paras. 50-57. 
77  Ibid., para. 58. 
78  Ibid., para. 60. 
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of international observers 1. makes it possible  to use the 
criminal law and procedure in 
force without infringing upon 
State sovereignty; 
2. avoids the difficulties linked 
to implementing a reform of 
the judicial system; 
3. promotes the effective 
application of international 
norms; 
4. can be set in place in a short 
time. 
1. does not encourage the 
efforts to reform the judicial 
institutions; 
2. might make the role of the 
observers uncomfortable (they 
could be restricted to a purely 
passive role); 
3. must be applied in 
conjunction with measures 
guaranteeing the protection of 
the victims and witnesses. 
make it possible to restore the 
confidence of the citizens in their 
own judicial system.  
2. Nonetheless, the model 
remains insufficient because it 
does not allow the judicial 
institutions to be reformed 
directly, or the difficulties linked 
to the compartmentalisation of 
the two entities’ judicial systems 
to be resolved. 
 
Use of the current national 
system together with the 
addition of international 
judges to the local courts 
The solution  
 
1. makes it possible to use the 
criminal law and procedure in 
force; 
2. makes it possible to 
guarantee that the international 
norms are better applied; 
3. makes it possible to 
contribute to re-establishing 
the public’s confidence in the 
local judicial system; 
4. potentially enables the 
international judges to 
contribute to reforming the 
judicial system; 
5. ensures effective 
collaboration between the 
Tribunal and the national 
courts; 
6. can be set in place in a short 
time. 
The solution requires 
significant legislative and 
judicial changes. 
 
1. The sending of international 
judges would make it possible to 
resolve quickly and visibly a 
number of crucial difficulties 
pointed to by the international 
observers (especially the 
citizens’ lack of confidence and 
the problems linked to the ethnic 
make-up of the courts).  
2. Although it does not allow for 
a substantial reform of the 
judicial system, the solution does 
however have many considerable 
advantages in the specific 
context of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (see column 1). 
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Use of the State Court  The solution 
 
1. makes it possible to use a 
local judicial institution 
currently being established; 
2. contributes towards 
encouraging the effort to build 
the State by the State itself; 
3. makes it possible to set in 
place a uniform practice for 
punishing perpetrators of war 
crimes, that is to say, one used 
State-wide; 




1. requires national legislation 
to be reworked in order to 
establish a specialised 
chamber at the court 
concerned; 
2. creates a difference between 
the jurisdictions and powers of 
the Court and the Tribunal, 
which are distinct; 
3. might bring about a lack of 
consistency between the 
procedure applied at the 
Tribunal and that at the State 
Court;  
4. does not best guarantee the 
availability and qualifications 
of the personnel assigned. 
1. Using a court currently being 
set up seems appropriate, as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina already 
has many courts. 
2. The creation of the court is 
consistent with the provisions of 
the national constitution. 
3. The creation of a State-level 
court will make it possible to 
resolve the problem linked to the 
separation of the entities, which 
currently causes major 
difficulties for punishing the 
accused. 
4. Such a court could be 
operational quite quickly, as both 
observers and players involved in 
the national system agree that the 
reform of the national system 
must commence as soon as 
possible.  




1. makes it possible to have a 
judicial structure perfectly 
adapted to the transfer of cases 
(it would be given 
exhaustively defined powers 
similar to the Tribunal’s); 
2. guarantees that international 
norms are applied effectively 
(especially as regards witness 
protection); 
3. ensures that the Special 
Court’s rules are compatible 
with the Tribunal’s; 
4. guarantees that prosecutions 
are carried out professionally 
(by making judges and 




1. requires that an additional 
court be set up. This involves: 
(a) the adoption of a Security 
Council resolution; and (b) an 
amendment of the national 
constitution which would give 
rise to long and complicated 
procedures; 
2. would make it necessary to 
use a criminal procedure 
greatly different and far 
removed from the local 
judicial traditions; 
3. would require considerable 
time to set up an institution of 
this kind; 
4. would compel the 
international community to 
assume a considerable 
financial burden. 
5. would be tantamount to not 
encouraging some of the 
necessary local reforms; 
6. would prevent national 
judges from trying war 
criminals as they would defer 
to international judges. 
1. Using a single court fully 
adapted to trying international 
crimes seems very attractive. 
2. Nonetheless, the establishment 
of an international court in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not 
seem appropriate since it in no 
way contributes towards the 
reform of the judicial system 
sought. 
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Which model was the most appropriate depended primarily on the specific nature of 
the cases likely to be referred.  Even if by definition a special international court was 
perfectly adapted to trying war crimes and crimes against humanity, the option of setting one 
up presented three major disadvantages.  First, it could not be operational immediately since 
it would require the Security Council to pass a resolution, which could not be taken for 
granted.  The court would also be extremely expensive, as this would amount to setting up a 
“mini-International Tribunal” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Lastly, the solution would add a 
further court to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s already greatly complex judicial scene.79 
The State Court appeared to the ICTY to be more conducive to reconciling the 
specific requirement of punishing war crimes and crimes against humanity with the 
particularities of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s judicial system.  Among the many advantages of 
using this Court, was the fact that it conformed fully with the provisions of the constitution, 
according to which the State had exclusive jurisdiction in matters of international criminal 
law and that, in September 2001, the Constitutional Court found that the creation of the State 
Court was consistent with the Constitution.  Furthermore, with the State Court it would be 
possible to guarantee that all areas of law were uniform on a national level as well as to 
resolve the excessive compartmentalisation of the judicial system between the two entities, 
which had been particularly apparent in the prosecution and trial of war crimes.80  Using the 
State Court was thought to avoid having to set up an additional court whilst also supporting 
the effort to build the State by the State itself.  This was seen as an essential advantage 
because all the observers and players involved in the judicial system of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina agreed that any reform of the judicial system’s structures could produce results 
only if it was consonant with the legal traditions of the State and carried out in close co-
operation with the existing judicial authorities.81  The district and cantonal courts could assist 
the work of the State Court, which alone would not be able to try the very large number of 
war crimes cases.  In addition to all the cases involving intermediate-level accused which 
should be referred by the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 11 bis of the Rules, there were all those 
involving subordinates which the national courts were hearing in accordance with the Rome 
Agreement which numbered around several hundred.82 
The process advocated by the ICTY was considered as precluding a complete 
upheaval of the judiciary in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Although new structures would have to 
be established, it was important to work with the existing judicial institutions and organs as 
they constituted irreplaceable reference points for the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
The State Court should handle only those cases involving intermediary-level accused which 
had been referred by the Tribunal, as well as the cases over which the district and cantonal 
courts would ordinarily have jurisdiction but whose sensitive nature required that they be 
tried on the national level, an assessment which should be made by the prosecutor of the 
Court.  In addition, the State Court could hear appeals against cantonal and district court 
decisions. Lastly, international observers should monitor the conduct of proceedings before 
the district and cantonal courts responsible for trying subordinates in accordance with the 
 
79  Ibid., paras. 60-61. 
80  Ibid., paras. 63-64. 
81  Ibid.,  para. 65. 
82  Ibid.,  para. 66. 
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Rome Agreement in order to ensure that they conformed with the most fundamental 
guarantees of the criminal trial83.  This was visualised in the following flowchart84: 
 
 
83  Ibid.,  para. 67-68. 
84  Ibid.,  para. 69. 
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Flowchart of jurisdictions 
 
Cases referred by the Tribunal 
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Cases tried in accordance with the 
“Rules of the Road” 
 
 
The ICTY also dealt with the pre-requisites for implementing the recommended 
solutions.  The participation of the national courts in trying war criminals presupposed that 
they were in a position to make impartial and independent rulings, in accordance with the 
principles laid down in the Statute.  As such, the authorities concerned should adopt general 
provisions inherent to the proper functioning of any judicial system, as well as more specific 
provisions in order to make it possible to punish war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
This meant that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to adopt general provisions in order to 
ensure fully the impartiality and independence of the judiciary and, in particular, prevent the 
political authorities from being able to interfere in investigations.  Moreover, it would have to 
make certain that arrest and pre-trial detention are covered by guarantees, ensure that trials 
are fair, make sure that the accused and detainees are treated equally without regard to their 
nationality, political views or religious beliefs, respect the minimum criteria for the detention 
conditions of detainees and convicted persons, and abolish the death penalty and preclude any 
possible means of reintroducing it. 
It was also considered necessary to adapt the existing national laws to the over-riding 
needs of punishing war crimes and crimes against humanity by sending international judges 
to serve in the courts responsible for trying cases referred by the Tribunal, making the 
national judiciary more familiar with the rules of international criminal law, through training, 
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adapting certain aspects of internal criminal procedure to the requirements of international 
criminal procedure, especially for the protection of victims and witnesses, and ensuring that 
all the serious violations of international humanitarian law established under articles 2 to 5 of 
the Tribunal’s Statute and the principles governing individual criminal responsibility 
embodied in article 7 are provided for in internal criminal law.85 
The Report concluded with the recommendations to the UN Security Council.  In 
order to wind down its mission – that is to complete its investigations around 2004 and its 
first instance trials around 2008 – the Tribunal had to further concentrate its activity on the 
prosecution and trial of the highest-ranking political and military leaders and refer 
intermediary-level accused, even if they are not yet in the custody of the Tribunal, to the 
national courts, principally, those of Bosnia and Herzegovina.86  So as to implement this two-
pronged process of “concentration” and “referral”, the Tribunal intended to take certain 
measures in order to ensure that the accused answer in the national courts for all the crimes 
specified in the indictments brought by the Prosecutor and confirmed by the judges of the 
Tribunal, the national courts respect the protective measures ordered by the Tribunal for the 
victims and witnesses, and the national trials are conducted in accordance with the 
international norms for the protection of human rights.87 
With this in mind, the Tribunal recommended that a Chamber with the jurisdiction to 
try the accused referred by the Tribunal be established within the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  It suggested that international judges serve alongside the national judges in the 
State Court for at least a certain period.  It proposed that the local prosecutors, judges and 
court personnel receive training in international humanitarian law.  It considered the 
possibility of having international observers ensure that the proceedings instigated in the 
district and cantonal courts pursuant to the Rome Agreement (“Rules of the Road”) would be 
conducted properly.88. 
The Report closed with a programme of action which called for the holding of a 
diplomatic seminar in The Hague to present the report to the diplomats serving in The 
Netherlands.  This was to be followed by adoption of amendments to the Rules in order to 
expedite proceedings further, submission of the report to the members of the Security Council 
and, by the first quarter of 2003, implementation of the process for referring cases to national 
courts.89 
 
IV. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS 
 
As indicated in the action plan of the June 2002 ICTY Report, Claude Jorda and Carla 
del Ponte visited Bosnia from 17 to 21 June 2002 to discuss the implementation of its 
recommendations.90  This was followed by the third diplomatic seminar at the ICTY on 27 
June 2002, when Jorda, del Ponte and the Registrar, Hans Holthuis, briefed the diplomatic 
community in the Hague on the aims of the completion strategy and the June 2002 Report. 
 
85  Ibid.,  paras. 70-73. 
86  Ibid.,  para. 83. 
87  Ibid.,  para. 84. 
88  Ibid.,  para. 85. 
89  Ibid.,  para. 87. 
90  Press release of 14 June 2002, JdH/P.I.S./681-e. 
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On 26 July 2002, after another plenary on 11 and 12 July 2002, Claude Jorda spoke 
again before the Security Council about the exit strategy.91  The Prosecutor, he said, had 
reviewed the investigations underway to determine the number of persons who should be 
tried by the ICTY and those who should be tried on the national level.  She estimated that of 
the approximately one hundred individuals to be indicted by 2004, fifty might be tried by the 
courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  A number of persons already indicted by the ICTY who 
might already be referred to the national courts of that country would have to be added to this 
figure.  She considered that these were principally intermediate-level accused hierarchically 
falling between the main leaders indicted and tried by the Tribunal and the minor actors 
indicted and tried by the national courts.  President Jorda asked the Council to exert all its 
influence with the Member States, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, to arrest the accused 
in their territory, especially the high-ranking political and military leaders, and transfer them 
to the ICTY. 
Prior to implementing a referral process, he stated that the ICTY needed to be sure 
that the Statute mandated it to take all the measures necessary to this end.  At the 
extraordinary plenary session of 23 April 2002, the Judges had observed that the Statute 
contained some ambiguities regarding the extent of the ICTY’s powers to refer cases to 
national courts.  As the texts then stood, it was not certain that the ICTY was authorised to 
implement a referral process whose scope extends beyond that then provided for by Rule 
11bis of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  He also pointed out the difficulties still 
remaining.  Despite the gradual re-establishment of democratic institutions and the return to 
peace in the country, the local courts were still faced with significant structural difficulties.  
These were said to arise mainly from the excessive compartmentalisation of the judicial 
systems of the Federation and the Republika Srpska, the lack of co-operation between the two 
entities, the political influence brought to bear on judges and prosecutors, the often “mono-
ethnic” composition of the local courts, the difficulty of protecting victims and witnesses 
effectively and the court personnel’s lack of training and the backlog of cases at the courts.  
President Jorda admitted that the OHR had embarked upon far-reaching reforms of the 
judicial system.  Although it would not be possible to complete this process for some years, 
the ICTY could begin referring certain cases as early as 2003, and thus a transitional solution 
would have to be found.  It would consist of establishing within the State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina a chamber with special jurisdiction to try serious violations of international 
humanitarian law.  He stressed that this plan was supported by the members of the Presidency 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The applicable procedure should be the one in force in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and not an international procedure, which would be complex, and constitute 
an amalgam of the civil and common law traditions.  Additionally, the local judges and 
prosecutors, most staff members, defence counsel and the accused would find it especially 
easy to use the “local” procedure as they were already familiar with it.  The trials of 
individuals accused of war crimes would be more in keeping with the legal traditions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and completed more rapidly. 
According to President Jorda, the jurisdiction of the State Court should be 
circumscribed in order to prevent it from being rapidly overwhelmed by the vast number of 
war crimes cases yet to be tried in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He recommended that the State 
 
91  Press release of 26 July 2002, JDH/P.I.S./690-e, containing the full text of the speech. 
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Court should handle only the cases referred by the ICTY and certain others which would 
normally fall within the province of the local courts but whose sensitive nature required that 
they be tried at the state level.  The State Court could also be made responsible for ensuring 
that proceedings in local courts respected the most fundamental guarantees of a criminal trial.  
The local courts should continue to be involved in prosecuting and trying low-ranking war 
criminals.  In order to enhance the effectiveness of the Agreement and guarantee the 
impartiality of the local courts, it might be appropriate to authorise international observers to 
oversee the proper conduct of the proceedings before such courts or, as the High 
Representative had proposed, to restructure them into a small number of “multi-ethnic” 
regional courts. 
A three-tier judicial architecture was, in sum, proposed by Jorda.  The first tier, the 
ICTY, would handle the major political, military, paramilitary and civilian leaders.  This first 
tier was temporary as it had to disappear once the ICTY’s mission had been accomplished.  
The second tier, the State Court, would handle intermediate-level accused who would be 
referred by the International Tribunal.  The Court was conceived as a national institution 
accorded a limited and provisional international character in order to guarantee its 
impartiality.  The third tier, the local courts, would handle low-ranking accused tried in 
accordance with the Rome Agreement.  Within this structure, the  ICTY would be responsible 
for overseeing the proper conduct of the second-tier trials and the State Court the third-tier 
trials. 
Following President Jorda’s address to the Security Council, a statement was issued 
on behalf of the President of the Security Council stating: 
 
The Council recognises, as it has done on other occasions 
(for example in its resolution 1329 (2000) of 30 November 
2000), that the ICTY should concentrate its work on the 
prosecution and trial of the civilian, military and 
paramilitary leaders suspected of being responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991, rather than on minor actors. 
The Security Council therefore endorses the report’s 
broad strategy for the transfer of cases involving 
intermediary and lower-level accused to competent national 
jurisdictions as likely to be in practice the best way of 
allowing the ICTY to achieve its current objective of 
completing all trial activities at first instance by 2008.92 
 
The next extraordinary plenary session of the ICTY judges took place on 30 September 2002, 
during which Rule 11bis was amended.93  It now reads: 
 
Rule 11 bis  
 
92  Ibid. 
93  Press release of 1 October 2002, JdH/P.I.S./696-e. 
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Referral of the Indictment to Another Court 
 
(A) If an indictment has been confirmed, irrespective of whether 
or not the accused is in the custody of the Tribunal, the President 
may appoint a Trial Chamber for the purpose of referring a case 
to the authorities of a State: 
(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or 
(ii) in which the accused was arrested, 
so that those authorities should forthwith refer the case to the 
appropriate court for trial within that State. 
(B) The Trial Chamber may order such referral proprio motu or 
at the request of the Prosecutor, after having given to the 
Prosecutor and, where applicable, the accused, the opportunity to 
be heard. 
(C) In determining whether to refer the case in accordance with 
paragraph (A), the Trial Chamber shall, in accordance with 
Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2002/21, 
consider the gravity of the crimes charged and the level of 
responsibility of the accused. 
(D) Where an order is issued pursuant to this Rule: 
(i) the accused, if in the custody of the Tribunal, shall be 
handed over to the authorities of the State concerned; 
(ii) the Chamber may order that protective measures for 
certain witnesses or victims remain in force; 
(iii) the Prosecutor shall provide to the authorities of the 
State concerned all of the information relating to the case 
which the Prosecutor considers appropriate and, in 
particular, the material supporting the indictment; 
(iv) the Prosecutor may send observers to monitor the 
proceedings in the national courts on her behalf. 
(E) The Trial Chamber may issue a warrant for the arrest of the 
accused, which shall specify the State to which he is to be 
transferred to trial. 
(F) At any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this 
Rule and before the accused is found guilty or acquitted by a 
national court, the Trial Chamber may, at the request of the 
Prosecutor and upon having given to the State authorities 
concerned the opportunity to be heard, revoke the order and 
make a formal request for deferral within the terms of Rule 10. 
 
Things then happened fast. Claude Jorda addressed the General Assembly again on 28 
October 2002,94 and he and Carla del Ponte both spoke before the Security Council on 29 
October 2002.95  In their speeches they both gave an update of the progress reached, which 
did, however, not present anything new.  The judges at the ICTY were also given an update 
 
94  Press release of 29 October 2002, JDH/P.I.S./707-e, containing the full text of the speech. 
95  Press releases of 30 October 2002, JDH/P.I.S./708-e (Jorda) and JJJ/P.I.S./709-e (del Ponte), both 
containing the full text of the speeches. 
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on the progress during the next plenary on 12 December 2002.96  A working group of ICTY 
and OHR experts met on 15 January 2003 to discuss preliminary technical issues, which was 
to be presented to the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board at the end of January 
2003.97  On 14 February 2003, the ICTY hosted the fourth diplomatic seminar in the Hague, 
where the diplomatic community was informed of the status of the efforts.98  Finally, on 21 
February 2003, Claude Jorda (who had just been elected a judge of the International Criminal 
Court, precipitating his resignation from the ICTY) and the Senior Deputy High 
Representative Bernard Fassier, signed joint conclusions on the development of the war 




The OHR-ICTY working group considered the institutional 
and legal framework, the technical and logistical 
requirements, the type and number of cases and the 
possible financial burden of developing BiH [Bosnia and 
Herzegovina]’s capabilities in this regard. The working 
group’s Conclusions show: 
 
• A specialised, three-panel chamber within the newly 
established Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is, in the 
first phase, the most appropriate institution in BiH to try 
war crimes cases. This Chamber will be an institution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina operating under the laws of 
the state. Nevertheless, for an initial period there should 
be a temporary international component in its judiciary 
and court management. 
• The Prosecutor’s Office of BiH must include a War 
Crimes Department with a temporary international 
component. In addition, due to problems remaining in 
BiH, there must be effective support for the 
investigation of war crimes and the apprehension of 
suspects.  
• The specialised War Crimes Chamber within the Court 
of BiH will have jurisdiction over three types of war 
crimes: those cases deferred by ICTY in accordance 
with Rule 11 bis of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (approximately 15 accused); those cases 
deferred by the ICTY Prosecutor’s office, for which 
Indictments have not yet been issued (approximately 45 
suspects); and those “Rules of the Road” cases before 
 
96  Press release of 13 December 2002, JdH/P.I.S./718-e. 
97  Press release of 15 January 2003, OHR/P.I.S./723-3. 
98  Press release of 14 February 2003, CC/P.I.S./727-e. 
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domestic courts, which due to their sensitivity should 
be tried at the State Court level.  
• BiH Laws shall apply. The ICTY experience will also 
be referred to in the development of specific rules of 
procedure for the specialised War Crimes Chamber of 
the Court of BiH, and in the review of the Criminal 
Procedure Code of BiH.  
• The establishment of the specialised War Crimes 
Chamber of the Court of BiH requires the renovation of 
additional facilities as well as adequate security 
measures.  
• The creation of state level detention facilities is a pre-
condition not only for the work of the future specialised 
War Crimes Chamber of the Court of BiH, but for the 
work of its other chambers as well.  
• A witness protection programme and a programme to 
provide security for judges and prosecutors must be 
developed. 
  
Both the OHR and the ICTY recognise that an effective 
war crimes trial capability within BiH is an essential part of 
the establishment of the rule of law and fundamental to the 
reconciliation process, creating necessary conditions to 
secure a lasting peace in BiH.99 
 
These conclusions were presented to the Peace Implementation Council in Brussels on 
28 March 2003 and are to be put before the Security Council as soon as practicable, although 
at this time, there are more serious problems taking up the Council’s time.100  Bernard Fassier 
briefed the Steering Board on the OHR-ICTY plan to enable the effective domestic 
prosecution of war crimes cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their evaluation of the costs.  
The Steering Board supported the objectives of this plan, agreeing that it was essential that it 
should be adequately resourced, and clearly define responsibilities for establishing, 
implementing, and then transferring to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the administration of the 
chamber before it is launched. 
 
* * * * * 
 
“Such a terrible complexity has been left by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which 
some desire to restore; such a complexity, in which nobody can be right and nobody can be 
wrong, and the future cannot be fortunate.”101  Thus Rebecca West, when talking about 
Croatia in her report on the Yugoslavia of the 1930s, described the immense problems of 
 
99  Press release of 21 February 2003, OHR/P.I.S./731-e. 
100  See press statement of 30 March 2003 at <www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=29583> (last 
accessed on 8 April 2003). 
101  REBECCA WEST, BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON, A JOURNEY THROUGH YUGOSLAVIA 112 (2001). 
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bringing harmony to the differing interests of and movements within the ethnic factions.  The 
same problems appear to persist today in Bosnia.  The international community, and 
especially the United Nations, intends to take another step towards achieving that elusive 
harmony by allowing the citizens of that country to come to terms with their past in their own 
way.  Whether the citizens, and more precisely, the judges, prosecutors, counsel and 
policemen, and above all the local politicians of Bosnia are ready for this endeavour is open 
to question.  In part the world community does so because of political and financial 
constraints on the operation of the ICTY, whose initial mission and subsequent procedural 
framework were never meant to allow the trial of dozens of minor to mid-level war criminals, 
and in part it will have to do its utmost in order to restore credibility to the international 
diplomatic forum and to exorcise the ghosts of Austria-Hungary which Rebecca West wrote 
about – there is a lot to be done.  Those ghosts are now more a thing of the past to us than 
they were in Rebecca West’s times, but the world is never short of new ones, and it would 
appear that the most recent ones have come to life in Iraq.  It is time that the leaders of the 
powerful nations spared the simple people of this planet the creation of terrible complexities 
– otherwise Rebecca West’s prophecy that the future cannot be fortunate will not only be true 
for the Balkans, but for all of us. 
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